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José Cláudio S. Castanheira2 
Abstract
Monitoring and interpreting an increasing number of images has become part of people’s 
daily lives. These images trigger a complex process of relations that can result in direct human 
or non-human actions over people, over services or over the very space. As part of a broader 
and widespread mediascape, the repertoire of images, its organization and connection to 
multiple devices and huge databases, make interpretation processes much more complex 
and beyond our reach. When arranged in a network, technical devices do not need to follow 
a logic narrative of facts. Paradoxically, they contribute to the construction of all possible 
narratives. This work proposes, from an archaeological perspective, that the intentionality 
of images, especially those that are produced and circulate in digital environment, is the 
symptom of a contemporary episteme that delegates to objects not just a functional autonomy, 
but also one of existence and of description of the world. The multiplicity of digital images 
makes of them Beings that exist beyond the human and that constitute a kind of continuous 
phenomenological machinic process, an awareness of the self and of the other.
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Por uma existência autônoma das imagens: 
uma perspectiva arqueológica
José Cláudio S. Castanheira1 
Resumo
Monitorar e interpretar um número crescente de imagens tornou-se parte do dia a dia das 
pessoas. Essas imagens desencadeiam um processo complexo que pode resultar em ações 
humanas ou não humanas diretamente sobre pessoas, serviços ou sobre o próprio espaço. 
Como parte de uma paisagem midiática mais ampla e disseminada, o repertório de imagens, 
sua organização e conexão com vários dispositivos e grandes bancos de dados tornam os 
processos de interpretação muito mais complexos e fora do nosso alcance. Quando dispostos 
em rede, os dispositivos técnicos não precisam seguir uma lógica narrativa dos fatos. 
Paradoxalmente, eles contribuem para a construção de todas as narrativas possíveis. Este 
trabalho propõe, de uma perspectiva arqueológica, que a intencionalidade das imagens, 
especialmente as que são produzidas e circulam no ambiente digital, é sintoma de uma 
episteme contemporânea que delega aos objetos não apenas uma autonomia funcional, mas 
também uma de existência e de descrição do mundo. A multiplicidade de imagens digitais 
faz deles Seres que existem para além do humano e que constituem uma espécie de processo 
fenomenológico maquínico contínuo, uma consciência de si e do outro.
Palavras-chave
Imagens digitais; Bases de dados; Arqueologia das mídias; Fenomenologia; AI.
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Introduction 
In Thomas Elsaesser (2018) work, we are invited to think about cinema from an 
archaeological point of view and as part of a larger set of communication practices 
born and developed over the last two centuries. Elsaesser tries to present new possible 
methodologies for the study of moving images, different from those classically adopted 
by Film Studies.
The first major question that arises for those unfamiliar with the perspective of 
media archaeology is how to renew the approach to an object so thoroughly studied 
by more hermeneutical biases. In relation to both form and content, traditional 
analysis has focused on producing some kind of rational connection between films 
and something external to them. Film’s meaning is therefore revealed through an act 
of interpretation – centered on narrative or on cultural issues related to the film as 
a social phenomenon. The interpretation and its resultant meanings depend on an 
external agency, which is that of the spectator, the critic or other human beings using 
intellectual mechanisms to produce human-centered readings of film discourse.
Existential phenomenology (SOBCHACK, 1992) presented the possibility of an 
equal existence of both the body of the spectator and the body of the film. Although, 
in this case, the production of meaning by the co-existence of multiple bodies 
transcended hermeneutic interpretations, the results of consciousness investigation 
is still originated and dependent on one privileged conscience from a specific sentient 
body. Little has changed in the subject-object relation and its inherent hierarchy.
As part of a broader and widespread mediascape, present in virtually all 
moments of everyday life, images can now be read and interpreted by non-human 
devices. Invisibly, the repertoire of images, their organization and connection to 
multiple mechanisms and infinite databases, make interpretation processes much 
more complex and beyond our reach. Each day, images manifest a more evident 
autonomous consciousness.
According to Vivian Sobchack (2011), media archaeology is an undisciplined 
discipline, which tries, through different methodological approaches, to deal with 
discourses originated from the materiality of media itself. Thus, archaeology must be 
concerned with how objects shape thinking and our being in the world. Archaeological 
bias recognizes a sort of agency from the objects, something that has not been regarded 
as important by classical humanities. On the other hand, for authors like Ernst (2011), 
there is no reason to look for meanings from a cultural point of view. Media (and he 
refers specifically to the material aspects of things) are themselves the very meaning.
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Therefore, we start from a type of narrative built from the multiplication of 
images. Understanding, based on the considerations of Bruno (2012), the permanence 
of digital traces of any action in digital environments, especially on the Internet, as 
potentially recoverable, we are faced with a virtually infinite set of images. The act of 
“reading” and “interpreting” all of these images exceeds human capacity, especially in 
the case of large collections of data compiled through different search engines. How 
to work within this chaotic scenario?
Based on Hayles’ (2012) proposals on the relationship with large databases as 
new tools for the humanities and from the expansion of the notion of agency by Latour 
(2013; 2005), we will think to what extent this proliferation of images brings us closer 
of a “truth” about the facts or simply relativize their very existence.
This work proposes, from an archeological perspective, that the intentionality 
of images, especially those that are produced by and circulate in digital environment, 
is the symptom of a contemporary episteme that delegates to objects not just a 
functional autonomy, but also one of existence and of interpretation of the world. 
The multiplicity of digital images makes of them Beings that exist beyond the human 
condition and that constitute a kind of continuous phenomenological machinic 
process, an awareness of the self and of the other.
Actor-network theory and digital traces
For Latour (2005), sociology traditionally refers to the “social” as a set of stable 
relationships that could explain the ongoing processes through which beings relate. 
The essentialist character of this conception would not be concerned to understand 
the flow of action between objects, limiting itself to display them as a result of larger 
structures: Market, Capital, Society. The relative permanence of relationships assumed 
in this perspective is problematic for not taking into consideration the determining 
features that “every” involved element has in the composition of association networks. 
Thinking of social as “associations” rather than as “social ties” allows a greater clarity 
on the composite character of society, whether relations may be transient or more 
permanent. The number of actors participating in those processes, according to this 
proposal, should increase. “When we act, who else is acting? How many agents are 
also present?” (LATOUR, 2005, p. 43). The task of explaining how the social is weaved 
becomes more complex due to the inclusion of all sorts of agents, human or nonhuman.
Technical apparatuses are a key part in building these networks. Describing 
them and trying to understand the relationships that arouse, however fleeting they 
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may be, is part of a dynamic process. Networks and collectives are thus constructed, 
mapped, reconfigured, and mapped again in an endless movement. The “social” is 
that what emerges from these changes. The fact that when we think of this type of 
configuration we make previously invisible relationships (and objects) visible is 
implicit in the adoption of these concepts.
The invisibility of objects is due to their accommodation in certain spaces. 
When they do not represent any kind of innovation or do not demand new forms of 
interaction, the existence of such objects is taken as something natural. Thus, the 
agency that such objects play seems not to come from them, but from a higher instance. 
When proposing innovations, artisans, technicians, or scientists renew their visibility 
(of the objects) and their role of mediation. In addition, the distance to these objects 
– either through space or time – nurtures their qualities of innovation. The strange 
arrangements proposed by old apparatuses displaced in time may be disruptive, at 
least shortly, for contemporary technology users. Familiarity or indifference towards 
the object can make it disappear from the horizon of our expectations. The failure or 
lack of efficiency of objects also endows them with a power of agency not previously 
considered. When a particular process is interrupted by a “technical failure”, the 
object transforms itself from an intermediary into a mediator. Its status changes 
from something that is just completing a gap between actions into an effective action 
proposer – an “actant”. This mediation can become a hindrance of great proportions 
the more objects are linked together. A failure of a server or of a computer network 
can result in the compromise of basic services such as electricity supply in a large 
area of the country. A defect in a car engine can result in huge traffic jams. Each 
technology brings within itself a “state of crisis” in which it was generated. This 
condition tends to be unnoticed as long as we get used to it. The dynamics involved in 
its development can be retrieved through archives and collections. We impose silence 
to technical objects when we take them as natural effects of social circumstances. We 
treat technology as something desirable, but at the same time, as a set of complicated 
methods about which there is nothing to be asked, just to be made use of. “How have 
the Moderns managed to miss the strangeness, the ubiquity, and yes, the spirituality 
of technology? How could they have missed its sumptuous opacity?” (LATOUR, 2013, 
p. 210). Latour suggests that in the very field of fiction we can find narratives about 
new relationships with objects. To give them personality or power over the human, 
as it has been common practice in fantastic and/or science fiction literature, is to 
recognize a deeper type of mediation.
To think about digital traces, as proposed by Bruno (2012), is to put into 
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question the state of visibility and invisibility of things. The trace would be a “quasi-
object”, located “on a threshold between presence and absence; visible and invisible; 
duration and transience; memory and oblivion; voluntary and involuntary; identity 
and anonymity etc” (BRUNO, 2012, p. 4). Traces have different levels of visibility, and 
that visibility, as mentioned earlier, is conditioned to techniques of observation, to 
the material conditions of traces etc. Its durability is likewise variable. The action 
of time and the various interactions with other objects can preserve or delete them. 
Thus, traces are also recoverable, some of them more easily than others. They are the 
result of more or less conscious actions: we do not always have a clear idea of what 
kind of trace we are producing when we act digitally.
Surveillance mechanisms have also been routinely used in order to help 
governments scan through the vast material found online and to develop the most 
sophisticated tools of repression. Facial recognition, for instance, helps finding and 
arresting suspects of criminal activities. The flow of traces, many of them in the form 
of images, is gigantic. The database thus constructed can only be “read” and analyzed 
“at distance” by machines. To frame and look at things have become now a much more 
complex activity.
Database and narratives
For Hayles (2012), the conformation of increasingly complex databases is both 
an inevitable phenomenon and an opportunity to broaden the humanities field of 
research. In general, the hard sciences have adapted more easily to new working 
methods from digital tools. However, the humanities, still attached to a textual and 
interpretative approach form, struggle to adapt to the new context. Symptomatically, 
Manovich (2013) identifies the software as an engine of contemporary societies. New 
technologies operate at different time scales and through cognitive processes different 
from that of humans. Hayles (2012) believes that a conceptual model for understanding 
the new interactions between humans and technical devices is needed. Close to that 
proposed by actor-network theory, Hayles asserts that
Objects are seen not as static entities that, once created, remain the 
same throughout time but rather are understood as constantly changing 
assemblages in which inequalities and inefficiencies in their operations 
drive them toward breakdown, disruption, innovation, and change. Objects 
in this view are more like technical individuals enmeshed in networks of 
social, economic and technological relation, some of which are human, some 
nonhuman. (HAYLES, 2012, p. 12).
Jo
sé
 C
lá
ud
io
 S
. C
as
ta
nh
ei
ra
Juiz de Fora, PPGCOM – UFJF, v. 14, n. 1, p. 52-67, jan./abr. 2020 58
Such interactions are just possible from a co-evolution of humans and devices – 
a technogenesis. Hayles starts from the theory proposed by James Mark Baldwin in the 
late nineteenth century, that when genetic modifications occur in a particular group or 
population, they are stimulated and accelerated through environment reengineering 
processes. This epigenesis has become more intense due to environmental conditions 
than to genetic factors. 
Thus, the way we interact with digital technologies necessarily imply changes 
in our physical and mental processes. New models of cognition have been studied by 
neurophysiology, neurology and by the cognitive sciences, pointing to a great plasticity 
of the human brain. The increasingly intense contact with screens of computers and 
other digital devices has resulted, according to Hayles, in a decrease of what she calls 
“close reading”. This kind of reading, characterized by a deepening in the content 
accessed and by an “interpretation” of an unattainable meaning of what is read, 
would be responsible for most of the cultural capital that literary studies produced 
so far. These, however, would go through a moment of crisis, being unable to follow 
the development of new forms of reading. Such practices mediated by new devices 
would differ not only because of the support on which one reads, but by the way brain 
and the environment are integrated. New arrangements of the body, the senses, and 
hypermediatic contexts do not support the close reading format.
The increase of information on the Internet has made available an amount 
of texts far superior to those existing in printed form. The hyper reading revealed 
itself as a necessary practice in these new environments. The rapid association and 
grouping of information according to themes and topics for quick and superficial 
researches is one of the strategies to cope with this quantity of data. The automation 
of processes via software works as an initial filter, preparing for a more deep reading. 
Anyway, filtering would be in itself a form of reading: a machine reading endowed 
with an extended memory.
Manovich (2001) sees databases as a cultural form representing the world 
through an unordered list. To arrange these elements would be the responsibility of 
the narratives, looking for a logical order, a sense of cause and effect. Viewed thus, 
“database and narrative are natural enemies. Competing for the same territory of 
human culture, each claim an exclusive right to make meaning out of the world” 
(MANOVICH, 2001, p. 225). Although current media objects still use narrative forms, 
when we talk about digital media, all of them depend on the database, to a greater 
or lesser extent. New media, to Manovich, are thought of from the construction of 
different interfaces through which we have access to more or less common databases 
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of information. The task of indexing this information has become perhaps one of the 
most important (and profitable) activities nowadays.
This logic reveals how databases determine the construction of knowledge 
and cognitive processes in computer culture. Using concepts proposed by Saussure 
to study natural languages, Manovich identifies the database as a paradigmatic 
dimension, wherein all possibilities of elements to be used in a particular formulation 
are virtually present. The repertoire delimits what can be said, but at the same time 
proposes new combinations, new interfaces. The syntagmatic dimension is identified 
with the narrative character that new media still preserve, although transformed. 
Traditional narrative forms such as literature and cinema work with a material basis 
in which elements such as words and scenes are ordered in visible forms. At the same 
time, they rely on a set of nonmaterial associations that could be a constitutive part 
of experience, but which are just potentially. The paradigm would be implicit while 
the syntagm would be explicit. “Elements in the syntagmatic dimension are related 
in praesentia, while elements in the paradigmatic dimension are related in absaentia” 
(MANOVICH, 2001, p. 230).
Besides its ability to cope with endless processes of grouping and indexing 
digital objects, the database works from a principle of self-containment. The user 
does not need to leave the database to describe it. It would be impossible to operate 
within the logical systems of computers unless it worked that way. The executable 
commands comprise objective actions that separate, organize and list the elements 
of a previous list. There is no action outside this perspective, or better said, out of 
this paradigm. The association in networks can expand the contents of the databases, 
but does not change its closure character. In the case of narratives, there is always 
something out of the set of previously planned actions. Narrative depends on the 
subjective construction processes involving text and reader. Reading, in the case of 
databases, is a machine reading, unable to deal with the inexplicable, the ineffable, 
the unconsidered or the impossible.
Narratives are temporal constructs that can bear different chronologies 
according to each of its levels (text, history and fable). The order in which the events 
are narrated is fundamental to the narrative, and the relationship between different 
temporalities produces a complexity that the database form cannot anticipate. Its 
main (and almost exclusive) function would be the visualization of information in a 
spatial manner, from the traditional arrangement in rows and columns “to the more 
complex n-dimensional arrays and spatial forms that statisticians and data analysts 
use to understand the stories that data tell” (HAYLES, 2012, p. 179).
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Data analysis in itself would build a strange kind of narrative – in general, a 
quantitative one – about the events. What has become a common practice is to delegate 
to numerical speculation the production of non-hermeneutical meanings for certain 
social phenomena.
Close to the machine
Bruno (2018) alerts us to the impossibility of “seeing” the city in its different 
scales. When we talk about “seeing” something of such magnitude, we hardly refer 
to an exclusively human act, especially if we have the intention to perceive it in its 
entirety. Images have always mediated both the need to apprehend a broader amount 
of space and the possibility of somehow storing that “space”. Countless cameras – 
especially those connected to some type of database (which, in fact, comprises almost 
all of them) –, positioned virtually everywhere, are increasingly ubiquitous elements 
in this mediation between the city and its inhabitants. Although, technically, we 
cannot consider cell phones as surveillance mechanisms, they are in fact continuously 
recording and providing our personal information such as routes, websites accessed, 
and places visited etc. to different corporations.  This amount of information helps 
to expand a database that is already quite extensive and that serves as a tool for the 
analysis and later use for a myriad of purposes. Bruno’s study focuses mainly on what 
she calls surveillance technopolitics: “Such mediation takes on vast and complex 
proportions with current systems of visualization of urban space based on technologies 
for capturing and processing immense flows and volumes of data” (BRUNO, 2018, p. 
238). Her interest, in this specific case, falls on the surveillance mechanisms of public 
spaces, such as the Rio de Janeiro Operations Center (COR) or monitoring systems 
in places such as subway stations that can “read” passers-by behavior, anticipating 
unexpected actions like suicide attempts. The hundreds of monitoring points scattered 
throughout the city produce a map not only of physical spaces, but also of the bodies 
and attitudes of individuals who circulate in these spaces. The network constituted by 
the integration between devices (with facial recognition capacity) and large databases 
is a fundamental element for the successful functioning of smart cities (a very popular 
notion nowadays). In 2017, the Japanese company Hitachi announced the development 
of a tracking camera system using artificial intelligence (AI). The system can perceive 
and differentiate more than one hundred individual characteristics such as sex, skin 
color, hair color, clothes, mannerisms etc. from each person in a large group.
Using this technology, it will be possible to detect a suspicious individual or a lost 
child using information from eye-witness accounts to detect a person fitting that 
description from public security cameras set up in large facilities or city areas. 
(HITACHI, 2017).
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The use of AI or machine learning in the production and analysis of these 
images has become a tool for not only State control, but is also spreads as a common 
mechanism for security and individual protection. Companies, specialized in 
monitoring apparatuses, offer a wide range of products. For example, IntelliVision 
website, at its initial page, presents us a short description of its services:
IntelliVision is a market leader in AI and Deep Learning-based video analytics 
and video cloud software. IntelliVision solutions provide actionable insights and 
intelligence for security and monitoring in Smart Home, Smart Building, Smart City 
and Smart Retail applications, and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) for 
driver and road safety in automobiles. (INTELLIVISION, 2020).
Monitoring and interpreting an increasing number of images has become part 
of people’s daily lives, even of those who are not aware of the existence of such cameras. 
These images trigger a complex process of relations that can result in direct human or 
non-human actions over people, over services or over the very space. Anyway, these 
digital processes inevitably produce traces, which are stored as data for later use.
The use of the term “intelligence”, when talking about technologies, refers to 
the fact that, due to abilities that certainly differ from human ones, these devices are 
able to expand their repertoire of information and refine the actions taken from there. 
The fact that this whole process is obscure for humans does not change the fact that it 
constitutes a cognitive capacity with a certain autonomy: an apprehension of the world 
through data, which is opaque for human consciousness. Attempts to compare machine 
consciousness with human consciousness, as if both were corresponding processes, 
must also be taken carefully since the two cognitive processes presuppose different 
logics. If, for existential phenomenology or neurophenomenology (MERLEAU-PONTY, 
2006; ANDRIEU, 2006), human consciousness is the result of the material conditions 
of the body and their relationship with the environment, this bodily materiality is 
dispersed and much more subtle in the coupling between the multiple elements of 
informational networks. Machines’ consciousness is produced by the communication 
between the points of its network’s rhizomatic structure, relativizing space, as we 
will see in the next section, and treating it through its own internal logic. Machine’s 
perception of reality may initially resemble that of its creators, but, in fact, it produces 
a distinct ontology of things.
Ross Goodwin and Gene Han, in a VICE journal online article (2015), demonstrate 
the camera they created, which, through Machine Learning, would record different 
people’s images and attempt to describe them in “human” terms. When confronting 
these images with different databases, the camera would try to guess their jobs, what 
they were doing at that moment, their mood, and other personal information. Goodwin 
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says: “We wanted to create an entity with its own sense of social awareness, its own 
eyes, and an ability to communicate with humans, albeit with some glitchiness that 
underscores the limitations of the current technology” (apud VICE, 2015).
In that test, the camera performs at least two operations. The first one is to 
record images and compare them to all other similar images organized in databases. 
The second, perhaps even more difficult, is to translate, albeit in a lamely way, into 
a spectrum of human competences, the results of the first operation. By asking the 
machine to describe “in English” what it could see, Goodwin is actually subsuming 
its perception to a restrict horizon within a human capacity to describe the world. 
Nevertheless, for the machine, “reality” doesn’t work exactly that way.
Goodwin in particular is interested in how machines “perceive” humans – [...] his 
last project featured a camera that would send the images it took to a crude artificial 
intelligence that then attempted to describe it in English. It was funny, and, for 
a second at least, it opened a channel between the human and mechanical mind. 
(VICE, 2015).
Media archaeology seeks precisely to describe the world through this non-
anthropocentric perspective, a perception of things themselves. This is paradoxical, of 
course, since the knowledge produced, after all, is destined to a human audience. The 
archaeological exercise, here, serves as an alternative that can reveal a redistribution 
of agencies in certain social systems. It is useful in confronting us with the fact of how 
far we are from an apprehension of the concrete world at a time when it is practically 
impossible to avoid technological mediation.
Elsaesser (2018) understands the digital shift as responsible for the adoption of 
archaeological bias, especially in the audiovisual field, as a practice and as an analytical 
concept. The widespread digitalization of production and circulation processes 
relativized the functions of various machines, practices, industrial processes, 
economic activities and personal habits, suppressing the differences between them 
and proposing a common praxis. In doing so, it led to the erasure of part of the 
history of media and accelerated the process of obsolescence of supports and devices. 
The changes in technological, social and cultural realms needed to be thoroughly 
understood and, for this, the historical character of the techniques, their organization 
in layers of time, needed to be highlighted. The bridge between disused and more 
current practices was a way of attributing to the new digital media a certain origin, 
even if they proposed strange and non-existent functions in previous analog media. 
By inserting new media into a kind of genealogy, it would be possible to analyze them 
more comfortably within contemporary cultural contexts. With this non-continuous 
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organization of different times, the feeling of an inexorable evolution of technologies 
can be questioned: “There was a distinct need for explanation, a review of the layers 
of time to accommodate all these transformations, but also to reconsider the very 
nature of the change itself” (ELSAESSER, 2018).
Being “close to the machine”, in the words of Ernst (2011), means understanding 
the functioning of devices, referring to a more pragmatic sphere of things’ possibilities 
in a technological regime.
Creating narratives about “real” events
The conversation between different digital networks – where there is no 
human intervention – also generates digital traces. These can remain indefinitely 
dormant or may be recovered somehow. However, there is no material evidence of 
their existence: neither from the actions of the machine, nor human ones. Although 
the idea of transparency is commonly associated with computers, they do not work 
quite that way. Rather, behind the interface that allows the access to information 
we have layers and layers of codes with which we are incapable of communicating. 
Understanding the code as logos, in the words of Chun (2011), is to perpetuate the idea 
that the software would be able to “create” things. Automatic programming, by freeing 
the programmer from direct compilation and repetitive tasks, allowed programs to 
produce other programs, creating a higher-level language. There would be, therefore, 
a greater control over the final product. However, this delegation of responsibilities 
decreased the effective control of developers over the machine, making the process 
more opaque.
As databases work more endogenously than refer to external factors, 
the relationship between information and “reality” seems to be weakened. The 
informational construct meets the needs of logical commands determined by search 
engines, data mining etc. The formulation of “truths” about this or that pattern of the 
database is a narrative determination that, as we have seen, is of no interest to the 
machine.
Therefore, “reality” is an artificial notion, which requires a rearrangement of 
prior knowledge. Once images and sounds come to us mediated by multiple layers 
of software, they present us with a paradigm, which lacks an ordering syntagm. An 
ontological rupture regarding the relation between the proliferation of images and 
their connection to concrete reality faces us. As for analog images, the fact of someone 
not being present at the moment of their production does not make them less real 
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or less concrete. Likewise, the fact that there is no physical record on digital media 
forms does not make digital images less true. Chun (2011) questions the relationship 
between what is “true” and what is “real”. In her view, the concepts are not equivalent 
and digital image emphasizes this difference:
Because a memory card can be constantly rewritten, there is, theoretically, no fixed 
relationship between captured event and image. Thus, it is not just that digital 
images are easily manipulated, but also that the moments they refer to cannot 
be chemically verified. Digital images, in other words, challenge photorealism’s 
conflation of truth and reality: the notion that what is true is what is real and what 
is real is what is true. (CHUN, 2011, p. 15)
The relationship with truth (in digital domains) is not given by the alleged 
invisibility of technological mediation – mediation that is materially evident in the 
traces of analog photography –, but given by the increasing sophistication of such 
mediation. The ability to show more evidences, of editing, of bringing out hidden 
details etc. can be understood as an easier and proper understanding of what really 
happened. The use of surveillance cameras throughout the city, as mentioned before, 
constitutes an indispensable tool for recollecting and verifying past actions.
At the same time, these images have no circumstantial existence indices. 
We cannot rely on a strip of negative film to prove a fraud: there are no laboratory 
procedures and no revelation chemical processes. The verification of authenticity 
in digital images is harder. But, like most processes mediated by computers, digital 
images resemble or act like transparent media, providing access to “reality” rather 
than a “dirty window” dealing with the opacity of the visible.
By thinking this way, we could assign a visibility of electronic processes 
in contrast to obscurantist analog forms. In their struggle to abolish noise, digital 
media make clear the commitment uniquely to the recorded object (a figure without 
a ground) and not with the interference from the machines. Noise jeopardizes the 
privileged view of the viewer, hence it would depart him/her from reality. This 
position ignores how mediated digital images are, excluding part of the experience 
considered as unimportant, but, at the same time, compromising a comprehensive 
apprehension of things. The control of images is so unavoidable, that, paradoxically, it 
seems that recording them is a quasi-direct perception, not conditioned by material 
determinants. It is actually a simulacrum of transparency.
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Conclusions
 Ubiquitous information systems and the abundance of digital images are 
important aspects of new media. As in the case of computational processes, these 
media intend to be transparent, but work through a peculiar logic. Understanding the 
number of dispersed images on the Internet as a paradigmatic set upon which search 
engines do not produce any subjective interpretation is to multiply the possibilities 
of narrative concatenation of the same images. Following the arguments of Chun, 
software, interfaces, computers, and digital imaging, work ideologically. Digital 
technologies and its extensions in society work with a logic of causality – a system 
ordained by codes, which, although not accessible, propose a blind faith in their own 
reason. The truth is not an accessible one, but we believe it to be functional.
The truth of the images is born within them. It is related to the network 
of associations created between devices, files, computer users and spaces. The 
associations are so ephemeral and fragile as vast are the nodes produced. Any 
narrative generated from the database of images is part of a larger and virtual 
repertoire of possibilities. There is no chance that any of them can work assertively 
as a representation or documentation of the “real.” As we have seen, the truth of the 
images does not imply a direct relationship with the “real” of the world. The essentialist 
meanings, criticized by Latour for an excessive emphasis on large structures, facilitate 
the narrative construction since they attribute effects of cause and consequence to 
the relationships between objects. When arranged in a network and, mainly, when 
made visible by the organization in databases, technical devices do not follow the 
narrative logic of the facts. At the same time, they contribute, paradoxically, to the 
construction of all possible narratives.
The “truth” of images does not imply a direct relationship with the concrete 
world. Any narrative generated from the image bank is part of a larger and virtual 
group of possibilities. These aim to attribute meaning and verisimilitude to the facts 
through an a priori of impersonality of technologies. Moreover, following Latour’s 
premises, the “imperfection” of devices puts them in a state of eternal visibility.
The intentionality of images, especially those that are produced and circulate 
in digital environment, is the symptom of a contemporary episteme that delegates to 
objects not just a functional autonomy, but also one of existence and of description of 
the world. The multiplicity of digital images makes of them Beings that exist beyond 
the human and that constitute a kind of continuous phenomenological machinic 
process, an awareness of the self and of the other.
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